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THE NEW DEAL'S LAND UTILIZATION 
PROGRAM IN THE GREAT PLAINS 
GEOFF CUNFER 
Drive the remote highways of the Great Plains 
and you will find signs marking US Forest Ser-
vice property in the midst of the nation's vast 
interior grassland, a place where it could be 
miles to the next tree, let alone a forest. In 
fact, the Forest Service (USFS) manages sev-
eral million acres of land in the Great Plains, 
public land designated "National Grasslands" 
and committed to grazing by private cattle 
ranchers. The National Grasslands are rem-
nants of the Great Plains past, their story 
rooted in pioneer homesteads and in the 
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drought and depression of the 1930s. USFS 
brochures explain the history of these parcels 
of public land in the midst of an overwhelm-
ingly private and treeless Great Plains: 
[Nlew settlers, called "sodbusters" by some, 
attempted intensive agriculture, by raising 
cultivated crops rather than livestock .... 
Between 1905 and 1915 as a great number 
of "sodbusters" came, the less desirable ar-
eas were homesteaded .... During the mid-
1920's, rainfall became less and less 
frequent .... With little or no rain, crops 
did not mature and homesteaders had noth-
ing to harvest. ... The soil, once held in 
place by the roots of native grasses and later 
by the cultivated crops during the years of 
good moisture, was now free to move, and 
move it did! Thus began the black blizzards 
which plagued the western plains for nearly 
a decade.! 
Beginning in 1934 the federal government 
repurchased 11 million acres of land from pri-
vate owners and created large, federally man-
aged grazing lands under the auspices of the 
Land Utilization Program (LUP). Government 
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FIG. 1. The 750,000 acre Little Missouri Land Utilization Project, North Dakota. 
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managers, so the story continues, reformed 
land use by revegetating cropland and con-
verting it to pasture. Grazing was better suited 
to the natural environment, and it conserved 
soil and grass resources, reduced wind erosion, 
and improved the quality of life for remaining 
families: 
Hundreds of thousands of acres were re-
claimed during this lO-year period. Most 
were reseeded to crested wheat-grass, a plant 
introduced from Russia. In 1945, at the end 
of World War II, these lands were once 
again as productive as many of those that 
had never been farmed. 2 
This is an attractive story of tragedy and sal-
vation. It has a bitter foe in the region's harsh 
and unpredictable climate; it has victims need-
ing rescue-destitute farmers and a fragile 
natural landscape; it has heroes-federal agen-
cies including the Soil Conservation Service 
(SCS) and the Forest Service. And it has a 
happy ending-a rescued grassland and pros-
perous ranchers.3 
In fact, the Land Utilization Program did 
not drastically alter basic land use in the ways 
the official story asserts. The program pur-
chased very little cropland at all. Most land 
that the federal government purchased under 
the LUP was not in crop production and never 
had been plowed. The government intention-
ally left most of the plowed land in its project 
areas in private ownership, and it purchased 
primarily unplowed pasture land, most of 
which was still in native grass. Budget restric-
tions by the late 1930s meant that the Land 
Utilization Program was able to reseed only a 
small portion of what little cropland it did 
acquire. The LUP did not convert cash crop 
land to grazing uses and did not reseed plowed, 
exposed croplands on the majority of its pur-
chases. What the program actually did was to 
transform informal, open range ranching to 
bureaucratically managed ranching. The LUP 
removed squatters grazing a de facto open range 
in preference for a "better" class of local ranch-
ers who subsequently acquired exclusive ac-
cess to federally controlled range. The story of 
the LUP is a story of evolving uses of common 
grasslands.4 
The largest project on the Great Plains, the 
Little Missouri LUP in western North Dakota, 
serves as a case study of the program. This 
location is representative of the implementa-
tion of New Deal land use adjustment through-
out the plains. Like most of the grassland, 
western North Dakota experienced severe eco-
nomic depression beginning in the 1920s and 
coinciding in the mid 1930s with the worst 
drought in recorded plains history. Here, as at 
some two dozen other Land Utilization sites 
across the region, federal land managers 
stepped in after 1933 to purchase private land 
from destitute farmers, rejuvenate it, and man-
age it for grazing, rather than for cropland. 
And here too restricted budgets and a disjunc-
ture between rhetoric and practice meant that 
the Land Utilization failed to achieve its lofty 
ambition to correct misuse of agricultural land 
in the Great Plains. The story of the Little 
Missouri Land Utilization Program presented 
here illustrates the practical application and 
ultimate limitations of one of the New Deal's 
most ambitious land use reform efforts. 
Billings, McKenzie, Golden Valley, and 
Slope Counties nestle on the extreme western 
edge of North Dakota, between the Little 
Missouri River and the Montana state line 
(Fig. O. Though mostly flat or gently rolling, 
the plains descend into waves of badlands along 
the Little Missouri River. Here the soft, silty 
and clayey bedrock erodes from hills and cliffs 
into piles of stony rubble devoid of vegeta-
tion. The badlands extend for fifteen miles on 
efther side of the river and for 150 miles along 
its course. In the cedar-crowded draws and on 
the steep hills there is hardly a place flat 
enough to run a plow. Floodplains along the 
river bottom are plowable, and there are occa-
sional high, wide divides between draws where 
steady winds comb short grass. Rain is scant in 
the region, averaging fifteen inches per year. 
Drought is a risk every season.s Long, cold 
winters prevent cattle from grazing year round, 
so supplemental feeding is necessary. Every 
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year stock raisers must buy or grow feed crops-
corn, sorghum, oats, and hay. Otherwise, ani-
mals may starve over the winter before spring 
grasses become available in April. It was in 
these beautiful, unproductive badlands that 
the Land Utilization Program established one 
of its biggest reclamation projects. 
The first Euro-American settlers moved 
into western North Dakota between 1879 and 
1900 to raise livestock on a vast expanse of 
open pasture available for use by whomever 
entered. The big land boom-ubiquitous in 
Plains history-came to western North Da-
kota between 1900 and 1920, and it triggered 
a thirty-five-year evolution of common re-
sources from open range to private ownership 
to government-regulated reserve. In 1905 the 
town of Sentinel Butte was exclusively live-
stock country. That year it shipped out 64 
railroad cars of cattle, 28 of sheep, 5 of horses, 
25 of wool, but only 4 car loads of grain.6 By 
the following year, however, farmers began 
to displace livestock raisers. In just two 
months in 1906 the General Land Office at 
Dickinson recorded over 1,400 homestead 
entries. 7 Throughout 1906 the Billings County 
Republican reported new arrivals weekly: "Four 
more cars of emigrant movables arrived here 
last Friday and Saturday. It is hard to keep 
track of them all."s The county population 
rose from 975 in 1900 to over 10,000 a decade 
later.9 Everyone jumped at the chance to claim 
a free quarter section ofland. In Sentinel Butte 
the newspaper editor homesteaded a plot and 
the schoolteacher left his classroom to take up 
farming. 10 
The Northern Pacific Railway and land 
speculators joined the boom, too. In 1906 the 
railroad patented 51,000 acres in Billings 
County for immediate sale to settlers and 
speculators. ll The biggest real estate operator 
around Sentinel Butte was the Golden Valley 
Land and Cattle Company, which brought 
speculators from Iowa, Minnesota, and points 
east to buy land. The company did a booming 
business, which was capped in May 1906 when 
an Iowa speculator purchased three town-
ships-some 69,120 acresY Generous rainfall 
accompanied the boom. At twenty inches, 
precipitation in 1906 was 30 percent better 
than average and crops did very well, with 
yields of 28 to 30 bushels per acre for wheat. n 
Even the ranches, forced to adjust to the loss 
of open range, made money. With new farm-
ers arriving, ranchers found a strong local 
market for their horses. 14 Land prices skyrock-
eted, fueling speculation. During the summer 
of 1906 the price of land rose from $5.00 per 
acre to $17.50,15 By 1915 land agents and the 
railroad listed property on the rolling plains at 
between $15 and $30, with "hilly or broken" 
badlands real estate starting much lower at 
$ 7 .50.16 Some people filed homestead claims 
and then sold relinquishments as soon as pos-
sible, a procedure that could bring a swift 
$1,000 profitY People moved in and out of 
the area quickly, acquired land, sold at a profit, 
and moved on. Yet many intended to farm, 
and every week brought news of homes going 
up on the plains and fences enclosing pas-
tures. IS 
In a few years farmers transformed land use 
in western North Dakota, and in the process 
the nature of common resources. The biggest 
change was a sharp reduction in the amount of 
free common grazing land available. As the 
government privatized land, new owners took 
action to prevent common use of their prop-
erty. Advertisements flooded local newspapers 
warning off trespassers. J. H. Moore adver-
tised that he now owned the odd-numbered 
sections (640 acres each) between Sentinel 
Butte and Beach, and no one was to cut tim-
ber there or trespass. 19 The "odd-numbered 
sections" suggests he had purchased land from 
the railroad, thus removing thousands of acres 
of formerly unmanaged open range from graz-
ing access. A man from Dale, Wisconsin, wrote 
to say that no one was to cut hay or graze on 
his five sections of land. 20 And the biggest 
landowner in the area felt the same way: "No-
tice. Any party or parties grazing or cutting 
hay on any lands owned or contracted by the 
Golden Valley Land and Cattle Co. in Bill-
ings County ... will be prosecuted to the full 
extent of the law."21 In 1918 A. L. Martin put 
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it succinctly: "Notice-All parties who own 
or have stock in their charge that are now 
grazing on lands belonging to the undersigned 
that this will be no longer tolerated. These 
lands are private property and not public com-
mons, and I am entitled to the sole use of 
them."22 
Although landownership changed quickly, 
sod busters had plowed only a small portion of 
the North Dakota grassland before the begin-
ning of the LUP. The primary cash crop in the 
three-county area was wheat, which grew from 
3 acres in 1899 to 37,725 acres in 1909, then 
skyrocketed in the next decade to 132,968 
acres. By 1929 farmers planted 274,576 acres 
of wheat. These acreages are significant and 
the increase was swift, but this plow-up took 
place in a region of 2,178,560 acres, meaning 
that at the peak of the wheat boom in 1929 
only 13 percent of the three counties' total 
area was devoted to wheat. Farmers grew corn 
and oats to feed their livestock through severe 
northern winters, with acreages varying be-
tween 14,000 and 69,000 acres, or between 1 
and 3 percent of total land area. Altogether, 
plowed land never exceeded about 20 percent 
of the entire three-county area. The other 80 
percent of land remained in native grass, but 
ranges experienced increasing use as well. Even 
as plowed land encroached on former open 
range, livestock numbers rose. The three-
county region had supported 21,000 cattle in 
1899 when most land was in the public do-
main. By 1920 cattle numbers had doubled to 
45,811. Thus, even unplowed land was more 
intensively used by 1930.13 
The economic boom faltered by the end of 
World War I, and social and economic crises 
mounted in the Little Missouri region. First, 
the good rains ceased. Rainfall was a dismal 9 
inches in both 1917 and 1919. Between 1921 
and 1931 rainfall in Golden Valley and Bill-
ings Counties was below the IS-inch average 
for 8 of 11 years, and for 7 of the 11 in Slope 
County.24 The counties issued bonds, using 
the revenue to offer small feed-and-seed loans 
to farmers unable to provide their own. In 
1918 Golden Valley County issued 125,000 
dollars in bonds for seed loans, and in 1921 
Billings County issued 90,000 dollars' worth. 
Fourteen years later Billings had repaid none 
of that money and had borrowed more. 25 As 
poor crop followed poor crop, farmers packed 
up and left without repaying loans or outstand-
ing property taxes. The Sentinel Butte Review 
reported a steady flow of farmers giving up at 
the end of the 1925 season. 26 Between 1920 
and 1930 population dropped by nearly 1,500 
in the three counties, a 12 percent declineY 
As of 1935, 49 percent of 1928 property taxes 
in Billings County remained unpaid, along 
with 59 percent of those for 1929 and 58 per-
cent from 1930.28 County debts climbed, loan 
repayment was slow or nonexistent, and tax 
income plummeted as people left. And all of 
this happened in the 1920s, before the stock 
market crash, before the Great Depression, 
and before the ferocious drought of the next 
decade. 
Between 1900 and 1930 the federal gov-
ernment privatized the public domain lands of 
western North Dakota, but the venture was 
only partially successful. Privatization took 
hold on the upland plains but not in the bad-
lands. By the 1920s almost no public domain 
was left to homestead. And yet, most of the 
badlands still functioned as a common range. 
The badlands were simply too poor to recom-
pense small farm or livestock operations, let 
alone repay speculative investments made at 
boom-time prices. The badlands were a patch-
work of unsold railroad land, state-owned 
school land, absentee-owned range seldom 
visited by its owners, who often lived in other 
states, and the small homesteads of latecom-
er's who had been squeezed out of better farm-
land on the plains but who nonetheless tried 
to survive in the beautiful, impoverished can-
yons. As the 1920s came to a close, badlands 
acreage reverted to the counties when land-
owners defaulted on property taxes. There was 
no one to manage or oversee any of these prop-
erties, so resident stock raisers squatted on 
them without permission and without charge. 
A vast, common rangeland had retreated from 
the wide plains but found continued refuge 
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FIG. 2. A livestock corral near Medora, Billings County, North Dakota, with a badlands escarpment in the 
background, July 1936. Photograph by Paul Carter. Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, 
FSA-OWI Collection, LC-USF341-T-011202-B. 
into the mid-twentieth century by huddling 
into neglected back corners of the Great Plains. 
It was here that federal land managers focused 
their attention in the 1930s. 
T en years of poor rainfall, poor crops, and 
growing indebtedness for individual farmers 
and ranchers left the community weakened 
when disaster struck in 1934. That year saw a 
record-setting drought during which Billings, 
Golden Valley, and Slope Counties each re-
ceived only 7 or 8 inches of rain. Over 240,000 
acres of cropland failed that summer. 29 Grain 
farmers were in dire straits, but cattle raisers 
were no better off. Feed crops died, pasture 
grass dried up, and hay-cutting was all but 
impossible. Faced with an approaching winter 
of starving livestock, ranchers sold nearly all 
of their herds. The federal government stepped 
in that year with a generous offer to purchase 
cattle in the Great Plains at above market 
prices from ranchers who needed to liquidate. 
Golden Valley County stock raisers lined up 
to participate, and for two months a backlog 
of thousands of cattle awaited railroad cars for 
shipment out on the government purchase 
plan.30 Of the 10,370 cattle in the county, 
stock raisers sold more than 9,300 in 1934.31 
In Billings County 59 percent of the popula-
tion was on relief in 1935, 62 percent in 
McKenzie County.32 Drought continued in 
1936, as rainfall again was a meager 7 or 8 
inches. In fact, 1934 and 1936 were two of the 
three driest years in a century of rainfall records 
for western North Dakota.33 
Although the mid-1930s drought was se-
vere across the entire Great Plains, the north-
ern plains did not experience the "Dust Bowl" 
conditions that impacted the southern and 
central plains. In fact, wind erosion in the 
northern Great Plains was only a minor prob-
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lem. Dust storms occasionally accompanied 
drought in the northern plains, but the prob-
lem was neither persistent nor comparable to 
the erosion disaster on the southern and cen-
tral plains. The classic Dust Bowl region was 
in the Texas and Oklahoma panhandles, east-
ern New Mexico and Colorado, and western 
Kansas.34 Lower temperatures, lower evapo-
transpiration rates, and extended spring snow 
cover meant very little blowing dust on the 
Dakota plains. Despite the dust storms farther 
south, federal land use adjustment programs 
concentrated their efforts on the northern 
plains, and the Little Missouri watershed in 
western North Dakota became the largest of 
the Land Utilization Projects in the grassland. 
The economic and agricultural disaster of 
the 1930s provided an opening for experimen-
tation with federal land use management. The 
idea had begun in the 1920s among econo-
mists in agricultural colleges who proposed 
removing "submarginal" land from crop pro-
duction. "Submarginal" referred to land low 
in productivity, unsuited for the production 
of farm crops, or incapable of profitable culti-
vation. A "land utilization" movement 
emerged in the 1920s to classify farmland as 
good, poor, marginal, or submarginal, and to 
forcibly retire the latter from production. Such 
planning aimed to reduce farm poverty, con-
tract chronic overproduction of farm crops, 
and protect land vulnerable to damage. M. L. 
Wilson of Montana State Agricultural Col-
lege focused the academic movement, while 
Lewis C. Gray at the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics (BAE) led the effort within the 
US Department of Agriculture.35 The land 
utilization movement began well before the 
1930s, but the drought and dust storms of that 
decade provided a fortuitous justification for 
a land use policy already on the table, and 
agencies such as the Soil Conservation Ser-
vice and Farm Security Administration, which 
benefited from increased land utilization fund-
ing, were the loudest to publicize and deplore 
the Dust Bowl wracking America's heartland. 
Yet 64 percent of all Land Utilization Pro-
gram purchases in the Great Plains were in 
Montana, Wyoming, and the Dakotas, far 
from the black blizzards of the Dust Bowl re-
gion.36 
Franklin Roosevelt initiated the Land Uti-
lization Program in February 1934 when he 
created a Land Policy Section within the Ag-
ricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) 
and transferred 25 million dollars from the 
Federal Emergency Relief Administration. The 
initial plan for the LUP was to purchase 10 
million acres of submarginal land across the 
country.37 The Land Utilization Program was 
one experimental agency among many in the 
early days of the New Deal. The program 
moved through five agencies within the De-
partment of Agriculture in as many years. First 
part of the AAA, then the Resettlement Ad-
ministration, Farm Security Administration, 
and Gray's Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 
in 1938 the LUP found some stability in the 
Soil Conservation Service (SCS), where it 
remained through 1953.38 In 1954 the Forest 
Service acquired responsibility for much LUP 
land, soon to be called National Grasslands, 
while another portion went to the Bureau of 
Land Management. Between 1935 and 1946 
the LUP spent 48 million dollars to purchase 
11 million acres of land around the country. 
By 1954 it had spent an additional 30 million 
dollars developing and rehabilitating that 
land.39 
The purchases of the LUP were concen-
trated in the Great Plains. In 1934 adminis-
trators identified the badlands along the Little 
Missouri River as a likely site for a Land Uti-
lization Program. They divided the region into 
two initial purchase areas. The areas in 
McKenzie County they labeled ND-l. The 
section that lay primarily in Billings County, 
overlapping into the eastern townships of 
Golden Valley County, they dubbed ND-2. In 
1937, with passage of the Bankhead-Jones 
Farm Tenant Act, the North Dakota LUP 
expanded with the addition of two new projects 
adjacent to the old ones. ND-38-23 added sev-
eral townships of land to the eastern edge of 
ND-2 in Billings County. ND-38-21 was on 
the southern border of the earlier projects in 
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Slope County. By the early 1940s administra-
tors consolidated all of these projects into a 
single unit, ND-24. When the Forest Service 
took over in 1954 the entire project became 
the Little Missouri National Grassland, which 
now contains some 750,000 acres of federally 
owned land acquired under the LUP.40 
Although by 1934 the federal government 
had disposed of the public domain in western 
North Dakota, an enormous acreage remained 
unoccupied and unmanaged, comprising an 
informal, uncontrolled commons. On ND-2's 
700,000 acres only 5 percent remained in the 
public domain. State school lands made up 
9 percent and the Northern Pacific Railway 
owned 10 percentY Nonresidents owned 48 
percent of the area. These were former home-
steaders who had abandoned their farms, re-
gional operators who lived in nearby towns, 
and distant investors who had speculated in 
land. Resident farmers and ranchers leased 
some of this absentee-owned land, but a great 
deal of it was completely unmanaged. Resi-
dent owners occupied only 23 percent of the 
badlands and surrounding area. These were 
small operators who had homesteaded 160 
acres or purchased similar tracts from the rail-
road or from a land company in the past 
twenty years. Much of their land was both 
mortgaged and tax delinquent. Billings and 
Golden Valley Counties owned 5 percent of 
the land in ND-2-tax deed lands recently 
confiscated for failure to pay property taxes. 42 
The counties had no mechanism for manag-
ing ranches and would have preferred to keep 
such land in the tax base. The badlands of 
western North Dakota were so poor that 
much of them remained unoccupied long af-
ter the federal government had distributed 
free land to citizens, private corporations, and 
the state. 
Some small-holders and tenants continued 
to try making a living in the badlands, but 
they were not cash crop wheat farmers. About 
two-thirds of the occupied land was operated 
by owners and one-third by renters, but re-
gardless of status farmers in the badlands re-
lied on livestock raising as their primary 
occupationY They grazed cattle, sheep, and 
a few horses on the rugged ranges around 
Medora and Sentinel Butte. Residents grazed 
stock on land they owned and leased but also 
on unoccupied land. Many were squatters. 
Government surveyors found that most resi-
dents relied on land they neither owned nor 
rented, nor even had permission to use. A 
common description of local farm units was 
"Considerable land grazed in common with 
other operators free of charge." Most had le-
gitimate use of a home plot and some range, 
and simply expanded onto nearby unused 
land, but some operators owned nothing. De-
scribing one rancher, a surveyor commented 
that "This operator is squatting on present 
location and is just using other land he claims 
to be renting."44 There was plenty of land to 
squat on. Neither public domain, state school 
land, county tax deed land, nor Northern Pa-
cific property had any formal management or 
any person to oversee its use. Private land 
owned by absentees was often unsupervised 
as well. These categories comprised some 
525,000 acres in the area, and several hun-
dred small stock raisers put it to use in a hap-
hazard way. Farmers may have had incentive 
to graze as many cattle or sheep as possible on 
unmanaged land, reserving profits to them-
selves while sharing the costs of overgrazing 
with distant landowners and other squatters. 45 
In 1937 the government recorded some over-
grazing but it was not percieved as excessive. 
In a hint at a communal solution to the "trag-
edy of the commons," government officials al-
luded to informal agreements between 
neighboring squatters delineating who would 
make use of which lands.46 The local commu-
nity negotiated internally about how best to 
manage its common range. Most residents 
plowed a small amount of cropland, too, usu-
ally on land they owned or rented. Winter 
feed for livestock was essential, and farmers 
either grew feed crops or purchased supple-
ments. Many also planted cash grains, mostly 
wheat, but in very small amounts. In 1934 
farmers in the area planted 38,000 acres in 
wheat, just 5 percent of the total areaY 
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Despite the small acreages involved, fed-
eral administrators exaggerated the role of 
wheat farming and identified it as the primary 
land use problem in the badlands. Cash grain 
farming on unsuitable land had been the tar-
get of the land utilization movement in the 
1920s, and removing such land from produc-
tion had political appeal in Washington. So 
administrators continued to use the rhetoric, 
even though it did not apply to the local situ-
ation. The May 1935 Final Plan for ND-2 said, 
"The purpose of the project is to remove sub-
marginal lands from commercial grain produc-
tion and shift them to a grazing use."48 Five 
months later the General Development Plan 
echoed those words: "The purpose of the 
project is to remove low grade crop lands from 
commercial grain production and shift them 
to a grazing use for which they are best fit-
ted."49 In December of that year, the message 
was repeated: "The development contemplates 
an adjustment in present usage of low grade 
crop lands for commercial grain production to 
grazing use for which such lands are naturally 
adapted .... Farmers have cultivated large 
acreages .... Unproductive lands will be re-
moved from grain crop production, restored 
to the original vegetative cover and returned 
to grazing."5o Federal managers in North Da-
kota misled their superiors in Washington with 
such language. In February 1936, an auditor 
in Washington evaluating a 143,000-dollar 
funding request reported, "This project ... 
involves grazing and 'hay vegetative' develop-
ments on 273,158 acres of infertile crop 
lands."51 He apparently was under the impres-
sion that practically all of the land so far pur-
chased under the LUP had been plowed, 
because that was the message administrators 
in North Dakota conveyed. A year later an-
other auditor in Washington evaluating a 
180,000-dollar request made the same as-
sumption: "The purpose of this project is to 
remove submarginal crop land from commer-
cial grain production and shift it to grazing use 
for which it is best fitted."52 With only 5 per-
cent of the 700,000 acre target area actually 
plowed for cash crops, such language by fed-
eral managers was disingenuous. In August 
1937, three years into the proj ect, W. F. 
Dickson, in charge of the Lincoln, Nebraska, 
Soil Conservation Service office, laid out his 
justification for the project. From the initial 
accurate statement that "This project involves 
the purchase of approximately 277,818 acres 
of low grade farm lands and untilled native 
grass lands to be converted to a controlled 
grazing use," he later shifted back to the stan-
dard line: 
The area in which this project is located 
has been subjected to an incorrect land use 
through the homesteading of small tracts 
with a view to cash crop farming opera-
tions. Because of the high crop risk which 
exists in the area, the standards of living for 
those who depend on cash crops have be-
come very low .... The correct fundamen-
tal use of this area is the production of 
livestock. 
An attached memo says, "the fundamental 
adjustment is from cash crop farming to live-
stock production, the use for which this area 
is best fitted."53 
What government administrators actually 
changed on the LUP was the management of 
common range lands, taking control away 
from poor local ranchers and placing it in the 
hands of government experts. This move mir-
rored the conservation ideology applied by 
Gifford Pinchot's Forest Service to wooded 
lands at the turn of the century. The LUP was 
part of a broadening of conservation ideology 
during the New Deal to encompass agricul-
tural land and rivers as well as forests. LUP 
managers developed a plan that would allow 
them to control chaotic and inefficient graz-
ing practices. 54 The first step was to purchase 
submarginal lands. This was the most decisive 
way to acquire control over their use, and there 
were plenty of willing sellers. The second step 
was resettlement-moving "uneconomical" 
small operators out of the area. Third came 
range rehabilitation, which encompassed 
revegetation of plowed land, restoration of 
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overgrazed range through resting, delimitation 
of logical pasture units through rational fenc-
ing, and water development. Water would be 
key to the success of stage four: controlled 
grazing by remaining middle-class stock rais-
ers. Fewer operators would have larger, more 
economical ranches. The government would 
ensure that no more cattle were put on the 
grass than could be supported sustainably.55 
In implementing the first phase of its pro-
gram on ND-2, the Department of Agricul-
ture purchased mostly pasture in native grass. 
When administrators proposed the project in 
1934 they estimated that it would eventually 
consume 56,000 acres of cropland (11 per-
cent) and 464,000 acres of rangeland (89 per-
cent).56 After appraisal and optioning, and as 
purchases began in earnest, the numbers were 
similar: the government planned to buy 53,604 
acres of cropland (10 percent) plus 459,700 
acres of untilled range (90 percent)Y Fund-
ing constraints resulted in more modest actual 
acquisitions, and an evaluation in January 
1936, when most initial purchases were com-
plete, was that ND- 2 would retire 19,432 acres 
of cropland (7 percent) with 268,568 acres of 
pasture (93 percent) comprising the bulk of 
purchases.58 Roughly half of the cropland was 
probably devoted to feed crops for livestock 
and not to wheat. 59 Despite its rhetoric of con-
verting land use from cash cropping to pas-
ture, only about 7 percent of the newly 
acquired property on ND-2 was in crops and 
probably under 10,000 acres of the 277,000 
initially purchased was planted to cash grain. 
The boundaries of the Little Missouri LUP 
were drawn around the Little Missouri bad-
lands in a way that excluded wheat cropping 
areas of the region. Sentinel Butte township 
in Golden Valley County is a good example 
because it straddles the edge of the project. 
The western half of the township is on the flat 
upland plains while the eastern half falls into 
eroded badlands. The year before the LUP 
began, 113 farmers grew wheat on the upland 
plains half of Sentinel Butte township, but 
only 14 grew wheat on the badlands half. Yet 
the LUP purchased land only in the badlands 
half of the township, leaving the true cash 
crop farming areas alone. Nearly all of the 
badlands half of the township is now in the 
National Grassland while farmers continue to 
grow wheat on private land on the upland half. 
If the government wanted to retire cash grain 
farming in the dry plains, it chose the wrong 
half of Sentinel Butte township for purchase. 60 
The LUP transformed access to resources 
more than land use itself. The government 
bought entire farms, so retiring cropland meant 
also buying the pasture land associated with 
it. But in most cases farmers were cultivating 
only the best land on their property and graz-
ing the poorer land. Ensuring that remaining 
stock raisers could provide adequate winter 
feed for their cattle was a serious concern for 
government officials. In some instances SCS 
transferred acquired cropland to remaining 
ranchers for use in growing feed crops, thus 
explicitly not retiring from production some 
of the little cropland it purchased. The Final 
Plan of May 1935 included the following rec-
ommendation: 
In view of the fact that limited areas or 
tracts of so-called "submarginal land" are 
in reality fair to good crop lands, and fur-
ther, since a number of resident stockmen 
do not now own a sufficient amount of crop 
land for the production of supplementary 
winter feed for their livestock, it is recom-
mended that limited areas or tracts of suit-
ably located crop lands be made available 
for purchase by the stockmen who need such 
lands to block out economic ranch units.6l 
Nearly all of the land in ND-2 had been used 
as range prior to acquisition. The small por-
tion that was cropped was the better land, 
mostly used for feed crops to support livestock 
operations, and federal managers worked to 
maintain some of that land in feed cultiva-
tion. 
Although the badlands along the Little 
Missouri River are exceptionally poor farm-
land, the practice of land use adjustment in 
North Dakota was typical of the Land Utiliza-
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FIG. 3. An upland wheat farm near Beach, Golden Valley County, North Dakota, at the depth of the drought, 
July 1936. Photograph by Arthur Rothstein. Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, FSA-OWI 
Collection, LC-USF34-005117 -D. 
tion Program in general. The purchase of 
rangeland in overwhelming proportion to 
cropland was not restricted to the North Da-
kota site. On the southern plains the Mills 
Land Use Adjustment Project was in the cen-
ter of the Dust Bowl in eastern New Mexico. 62 
Administrators there described numerous 
farms ruined by eroded soils and drifted dunes 
of blown sand. Despite the wind erosion prob-
lem on the southern plains, the New Mexico 
project was much smaller than that in North 
Dakota. Federal agents had purchased only 
73,112 acres ofland by 1940. Of that, 19,085 
acres, or 26 percent, had been in cultivation. 
Restricted rehabilitation budgets meant that 
most of that land was left to revegetate on its 
own, which it did quickly. The project planned 
to reseed only 2,500 acres. 63 On the Mills 
project the government reseeded less than 4 
percent of the land it purchased. In the heart 
of the Dust Bowl the Department of Agricul-
ture acquired a higher percentage of plowed 
land than in North Dakota, but even there 
three quarters of the property it bought was 
already used as rangeland. Despite the empha-
sis of the Soil Conservation Service and the 
Forest Service on the conversion of plowed 
land to range and the mitigation of wind ero-
sion, the LUP retired very little land devoted 
to cash crops, reseeded less, and did not focus 
its efforts on the region of greatest wind ero-
sion activity. 
In 1937 Congress reenergized the Land 
Utilization Program with the Bankhead-Jones 
Farm Tenant Act. Title III of the law gave the 
LUP 50 million dollars. Congress would later 
reduce that appropriation, but in the mean-
time land purchases resumed. Title III in-
structed the Secretary of Agriculture to 
"develop a program of land conservation and 
land utilization, including the retirement of 
lands which are submarginal or not primarily 
suitable for cultivation." In North Dakota, 
project manager M. B. Johnson moved to ac-
quire more land for ND-2 in Billings and 
Golden Valley Counties. The language in Title 
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III seemed to require the retirement of culti-
vated land only, and this caused planners some 
concern. They were careful to incorporate the 
law's words in justifying new purchases in west-
ern North Dakota. In 1937 C. F. Clayton wrote 
to Paul Koenig, head of acquisition, describing 
the type ofland he intended to add to ND-2: 
As a general rule the tracts are devoted 
largely to the production of cash crops in 
an area best adapted to a grazing economy. 
The tracts were taken up at one time as 
homesteads and came to be operated mainly 
on a cash crop basis .... The purpose of the 
project is to remove sub-marginal crop land 
from commercial grain production and shift 
it to grazing use.64 
In early 1938 the purchase went forward. The 
department added 14,120 acres to ND-2, of 
which only 2,595 acres were cultivated land, 
the remainder range.65 Despite the specific 
legal requirements of Title III, only 19 per-
cent of the new acquisition was plowed. Land 
purchased in the new ND-38-23 area appar-
ently did not even reach that standard. In one 
lot of sixteen parcels comprising 4,560 acres 
there were only 320 acres of abandoned crop-
land to be retired-7 percent of the total. 66 
As the slow legal process of accepting op-
tions, clearing title, and resettling residents 
moved forward through 1936, initial land re-
habilitation got under way on ND-2. Now the 
Resettlement Administration would have a 
chance to put into action the plan its admin-
istrators had for years anticipated: restoring 
the land to health and rationalizing resource 
use. Now that ownership had been recast, the 
social structure of the land had to be rear-
ranged by removing families, obliterating 
farmsteads, and most importantly-both sym-
bolically and ecologically-refencing the land 
to reflect a controlled grazing commons. Un-
der the old, uncontrolled grazing system, fences 
were of uncertain quality, sometimes poorly 
maintained, and as often as not simply absent. 
Government optioners had difficulty describ-
ing landownership accurately because prop-
erty boundaries were not marked on the ground 
with fencesY The Department of Agriculture 
set out to remedy such chaos. Employees re-
moved 150 miles of old fence on ND-2, rear-
ranged grazing units, and built 120 miles of 
new fence to divide the range more "ratio-
nally."68 
A key to rationalizing resource use was water 
development. Getting the most use possible 
out of the grassland meant spacing livestock 
evenly. This would allow maximum consump-
tion of the resource without overgrazing popu-
lar spots. Fences supported livestock spacing, 
but water developments were the most impor-
tant tool. Cattle graze near a water source and 
do not stray far from it. Having only a few 
watering sites on a range means overuse of 
grass around water locations and underuse of 
grass distant from water. The project put more 
effort into water developments than any other 
category of range improvements, developing 
springs, building impoundment and diversion 
dams, and drilling wells powered by windmills. 
Reseeding croplands to grass was one of the 
most difficult rehabilitation projects SCS tack-
led. Despite ambitious goals, the LUP was able 
to replant only a small amount of land to grass. 
By 1939 the Resettlement Administration and 
the Bureau of Agricultural Economics had re-
seeded only 5,084 acres on the entire 750,000-
acre Little Missouri project.69 Considering the 
rhetorical weight the program placed on the 
conversion of cropland to grassland, reseed-
ing was an important symbol in land rehabili-
tation. The majority of fields to be reseeded 
had been abandoned for several years by the 
time SCS was ready to return them to grass. In 
that time they went through the early stages 
of ecological succession, initially growing over 
with annual weeds, then shifting to native 
grasses and forbs on their own. 70 After the 
early lull in cropland reclamation, reseeding 
increased in 1940 and 1941. The SCS had 
ambitious plans for the LUP. In early 1941 it 
projected that 94,217 acres needed seeding 
to grass. 71 By mid-April the estimate had 
dropped to 60,000 acres.n At the end of 1941 
planners hoped to reseed only 40,000 acres. 73 
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FIG. 4. North Dakota farmers awaiting payment in a Resettlement Administration office, July 1936. Photograph 
by Arthur Rothstein. Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, FSZ-OWI Collection, LC-
USF34-005141-E. 
Reseeding estimates did not decline because 
the LUP had succeeded in planting 50,000 
acres in the course of the year. By mid-1941 
the project had reseeded only 15,383 acres. 74 
In 1941 manager M. B. Johnson's superiors 
hoped to use a five-man crew on each of four 
tractors, running for sixteen hours a day be-
ginning 1 September and working until the 
first freeze. At that rate, they estimated they 
could\ seed 22,500 acres a year for four years 
and finish the job. 75 But manpower shortages 
and other work commitments interfered with 
seeding plans. Slow seed supplies, the experi-
mental nature of the work, and, most impor-
tantly, limited budgets held accomplishments 
far below goals. In the spring season of 1942 
administrators planned to replant 2,525 acres 
but succeeded in seeding only 380.76 That year 
Johnson complained that the only man avail-
able to run a reseeding tractor refused to work 
f9r the low wages-$3.33 per day-the SCS 
was allowed to pay, and that no seeding was 
likely to be done for the foreseeable future. 77 
In the fall he expected to rely solely on volun-
teer labor for the project. 78 It is not clear pre-
cisely how much land the government finally 
replanted to grass on the Little Missouri. As of 
fall 1942, eight years into the project, the LUP 
had seeded only 18,400 of the approximately 
750,000 acres in the project. 79 Additional acre-
age may have received treatment after 1942, 
but with World War II, the end of the drought, 
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and economic recovery from the depression, 
the urgency of the LUP seemed diminished, 
and funding declined steadily. 
When reseeding was finished, old fences 
obliterated and new ones built, families and 
homesteads removed, ponds constructed and 
springs developed, the birth of the LUP was 
complete. By the mid-1940s the government 
had turned range chaos into rational grass use. 
The task now was to maintain proper range 
use into the indefinite future. Work had re-
volved around rehabilitation of damaged re-
sources in the first eight years. Proper 
management of that rejuvenated grassland 
would be an ongoing task. Government offi-
cials wanted people to use the reserve fully 
and efficiently but also sustainably. The prac-
tical implementation of such land use required 
the creation of local grazing associations com-
prised of the "better" area stock raisers who 
remained after the removal of less efficient 
opera tors. 80 
The Medora Grazing Association (MGA), 
which came to control federal lands in ND-2 
and ND-38-23, is representative of the newly 
created institution.8! There-were three require-
ments for joining the association. First, ranch-
ers must be "dependent" upon the reserved 
land. A stock raiser was considered dependent 
on grazing lands controlled by the association 
when the operating unit was "within or near 
the exterior boundaries of the grazing district 
and such lands are necessary for the economic 
operation of the ranch unit." Second, partici-
pating ranchers must have grazed cattle in the 
area prior to September 1934. The final re-
quirement for membership was "commensura-
bility." This referred to a stock raiser's ability 
to feed livestock over the winter when range 
grass was not available. A rancher had to own 
or lease enough private land to grow feed crops, 
cut hay, and put livestock on winter pasture 
for the four months they were not allowed on 
the federal reserve. Commensurable land in-
cluded winter pasture, land cultivated in feed 
crops, and alfalfa or native hay meadows. A 
user had to be able to produce a quarter ton of 
roughage per animal grazed on the reserve.82 
Because the LUP wanted to support middle-
class ranchers rather than large operations, 
access to the reserve was capped at a maxi-
mum of 350 cattle per rancher, a limit that 
remains in effect today.83 Grazing fees were 
variable from year to year, allowing managers 
to reduce them during droughts when money 
was tight.84 Small, poor ranchers who remained 
in the area could not qualify to join the MGA 
and no longer had access to free use of lands 
they did not own. The grazing association was 
made up of local people, not absentees. It con-
sisted of established stock raisers rather than 
newcomers. And it was an association of fam-
ily operations with access to good private land, 
buildings, and homes within the boundaries 
of the grazing district or immediately adjacent 
to it. By 1938 nearly three quarters of remain-
ing stock raisers in the area had joined the 
MGA.85 
To extend its influence without additional 
cost, the government insisted that the grazing 
associations lease as much of the remaining 
private land within the district as possible.86 
Government planners realized that there were 
cheaper ways to adjust land use than by buy-
ing property. One effect of the piecemeal ac-
quisition process was a checkerboard pattern 
of ownership. Private property, federal prop-
erty, and state, county, and railroad land inter-
mingled. By requiring the grazing association 
to lease intermixed private land, and then to 
apply the same grazing program to all land it 
controlled, the government regulated land use 
on additional property without purchasing it. 
By 1940 the Medora and McKenzie County 
Grazing Associations grazed 821,624 acres of 
land, of which 575,067 acres were federally 
owned. Thus the government controlled the 
stocking rate on an additional quarter million 
acres that it did not own.87 
The most important issue for range man-
agement is carrying capacity, the amount of 
land necessary to support an animal without 
land degradation.88 On the new reserve the 
government had the right to establish the car-
rying capacity, and grazing associations were 
bound to limit range use at that level on both 
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their federal and private land. In case of 
drought the government could further curtail 
stocking rates.89 Initially, government manag-
ers were uncertain how many cattle the North 
Dakota badlands could support. Before the 
Land Utilization Program the average opera-
tor in the badlands controlled 2,000 acres, on 
which he grazed 83 cattle, a stocking rate of 
24 acres per animal for twelve months.90 Fed-
eral administrators initially established the 
very same stocking rate for the reserve, but for 
only eight months each year. In 1940 they 
reduced it to 28 acres before a careful range 
survey established 20 acres per animal over 
eight months as an acceptable carrying capac-
ity, a rate that would put more cattle on the 
range than had been there before the LUP.91 
There may have been good reason for this, as 
federal fencing and water developments dis-
tributed cattle more evenly across the grass-
land. 
Federal attempts to establish a sustainable 
stocking rate were mostly academic in the first 
decade of the LUP. Actual grazing was far be-
low these theoretical carrying capacities. The 
1934-1936 drought cut livestock numbers dras-
tically across western North Dakota.92 On ND-
2, although government managers determined 
there was room for 14,555 cattle in 1938, the 
MGA could only muster 1,146 animals to stock 
the range. 93 In that first year on federal land, 
cattle grazed at the astonishing rate of 304 
acres per animal. Livestock numbers increased 
considerably the next year, when the stocking 
rate was 70 acres per animal. 94 In 1940 herds 
recovered more, so that the rate on ND-2 was 
46 acres per animal. 95 This was far below the 
24 acres per animal that government manag-
ers then estimated the range could support. It 
took more than ten years for herds to recover; 
by 1948 they nearly filled available govern-
ment permits, at a rate of 28 acres per ani-
mal.96 
As livestock herds slowly grew, the range 
improved. The 1934-1936 drought curtailed 
grass growth but the accompanying reduction 
of livestock would have allowed range recov-
ery without government assistance. A comb i-
nation of three good years of rain and 
understocking of pastures restored the grass. 
Ranchers claimed the range was in excellent 
shape as early as 1939, and in 1941 the local 
agricultural experiment station reported that 
the grass had fully recovered.97 This prompt 
recovery suggests that the range was not seri-
ously overstocked or badly damaged prior to 
the drought and government purchase. None-
theless, federal management ensured that 
stocking rates declined, from around 24 acres 
per animal for twelve months in the early 1930s 
to eventually hover around 28 acres per ani-
mal for eight months a year. 
As America approached World War II con-
gressional and popular support for the Land 
Utilization Program waned and operating bud-
gets declined. Significant land purchases and 
rehabilitation ceased by 1943. After the war 
the economy boomed, agriculture did well, and 
the LUP became a distant memory. It is an 
open question what might have happened in 
the North Dakota badlands without govern-
ment intervention. The drought that removed 
practically all cattle from the badlands in the 
mid-1930s would have provided a decade-long 
rest for the range, even without the LUP. 
Abandoned farmland would have begun a 
natural succession back to grassland. Although 
full recovery of plowed ground takes a century 
or more, it seems unlikely that the reseeding 
done by SCS moved the process along any 
faster. The LUP did reduce stocking rates 
slightly below previous levels and rationalized 
use of the grass resource. The LUP, with its 
support for middle-class stock raisers and its 
limit of 350 animals per operaror, also put 
access to resources in the hands of medium-
sized operators rather than either small or very 
large ranchers. The program did not alter cash 
crop wheat farming in the region to any great 
extent. 
Today, wheat farming continues on the 
upland plains in western North Dakota. In 
1987 Billings, Golden Valley, and Slope 
County farmers devoted over 400,000 acres to 
wheat cropping (in the form of wheat land 
and cultivated summer fallow), 19 percent of 
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the entire land area, compared to about 
275,000 acres and 13 percent ofland in 1929.98 
Despite claims of retiring cash grain farmland, 
only about 7 percent of the property the De-
partment of Agriculture purchased on ND-2 
had been plowed. Probably half of that was 
devoted to feed crops, a land use the depart-
ment approved of, allowed to continue, and 
encouraged in remaining stock raisers. The 
LUP did not convert substantial amounts of 
land from cash crop farming to grazing. Re-
seeding covered only about 20,000 of the 
750,000 acres in the present Little Missouri 
National Grassland. The badlands had been 
used for grazing and still were in 1934. They 
still are today. The primary consequence of 
the LUP was to bring federally managed order 
to private exploitation of common resources. 
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